With tourism, the existence of country-specific commodities that have to be bought and consumed locally plays an essential role. The paper is about how optimal taxation rules are modified when the taxable goods include goods demanded by tourists. The main point is that tax rates can be manipulated to shift some of the tax burden from domestic residents onto tourists. There is indeed a reason why an optimum taxation approach is useful for tourism, as the goods are consumed inside the host country, and discrimination is difficult.
Introduction
Tourism 1 today is not only a vital source of foreign currency, but it is one of the fastest growing industries in many parts of the world. Travel is placed rather high in the consumers' scale of preferences. The tourist explosion cannot be regarded as a passing phenomenon. The growth of incomes, the reduction in working hours and the saturation of other forms of consumer spending will cause the trend to continue.
Government policy can play an important role in tourism. First, the government may encourage tourism by advertising tourist attractions abroad. Second, by adopting an appropriate pricing policy it may ensure that the economy achieves the full benefits from tourism. Tax revenue is likely to be the major source of benefits. It provides a method of extracting rents from tourists for the services of the unpriced natural amenities that they consume.
Despite the positive impacts tourism can present a threat to the environment.
Environmental impacts grow in line with increases in the number of tourists. Natural and built environments can be damaged by excessive flows of tourists. Congested museums, polluted beaches and eroded landscapes can be problems in tourism areas. A balance between tourism and the environment should be maintained.
The literature on tourism has had its focal point in modelling tourist demand. The framework of consumer demand theory has been used in econometric studies to examine how demand for tourist services or tourist destination areas will react to changes in the main determinants of demand, such as income levels and relative prices. 2 Other issues remain scarce. Copeland (1991) , however, has examined the effects of an increase in tourism on welfare, output and factor prices in the host country using a general equilibrium international trade model. He shows that in the absence of taxes, foreign ownership and distortions, an increase in foreign visitors will increase welfare only if the price of non-tradeables 3 increases. Commodity taxes tend to increase the gains from tourism, while factor mobility and foreign ownership tend to reduce them. Diamond (1969) has written a paper on tourism, dealing with optimal pricing. This paper investigates the effects of international tourism on optimal commodity taxes. There is indeed a reason why an optimum taxation approach is useful for tourism, as the goods are consumed inside the host country, and discrimination is difficult. The investigation starts by considering tourist demand for goods and the motivation to travel. In the third section the well-known commodity tax rules will be modified to include the effect of foreign demand. 4 An extended version of the problem is considered, where the number of tourists, previously taken exogenous, is a function of a typical tourist's utility level. In section 4 externalities such as congestion and other costs due to tourism are discussed. The model is amended to allow for an externality associated with the consumption of one of the goods purchased by tourists. In section 5 possible extensions are introduced. Section 6 concludes.
Tourist Demand
The fundamental motivation for tourist travel is a need, real or perceived, for a break from routine that can best be achieved by a physical change of place. People travel for pleasure. Tourism is about consuming goods and services which are in some sense unnecessary. They are consumed because they supposedly generate pleasurable experiences which are different from those typically encountered in everyday life.
A basic distinction between tourism and other forms of leisure is the travel component. To be able to satisfy his desire to travel, the tourist must be able to afford both the time and the money. Tourism in turn gives rise to various service demands.
It should be noted that almost all the services provided to tourists have to be delivered at the time and place in which they are produced. Tourist products cannot be stored.
Tourism-oriented products include such as accommodation, restaurants, transportation and entertainment. As tourists extend their stay at destination sites, they may increase the use of resident-oriented products, such as hospitals, bookstores, or barber shops. However, their main reason for travelling is to enjoy the background tourism elements: natural, sociocultural and manmade attractions. Some background tourism elements are often free goods, for example sunshine.
Tourist demand for goods is similar to the demand for most other products and services. The basic determinants are prices, disposable incomes, tastes, habits and preferences.
A considerable number of studies of the determinants of tourist demand have been published. 5 There are wide variations in the values of estimated elasticities. However, most of the significant price elasticities were below one, and demand turned out to be highly responsive to income changes. The high income elasticity of demand for tourist services will classify tourism as a luxury. As incomes increase the proportion spent on necessities lessens, leaving more money available for discretionary spending. This income will be spent on leisure, recreation and travel. 
Optimal Commodity Taxes and Tourism
Most countries use commodity taxes and subsidies to raise revenues or to meet social objectives. When a country is visited by tourists, the main question that arises in this context is: How tax rates should be manipulated to shift some of the tax burden from domestic residents onto tourists? Unless rebates to visitors are feasible, tourists will trade at the same prices as resident consumers. When the government collects an exogenously determined sum in taxes, the welfare of the inhabitants in the country could be raised by more the greater the part tourists pay of it. But we have to keep in mind that taxes, which are assumed to be the same for all consumers, also affect home welfare.
The Economy
Let us consider the simplest economy imaginable. Suppose that the consumer side of the economy can be treated as if there were only one consumer. Tourists are regarded as an important trading opportunity for the country, and the aim is to maximize the welfare of domestic consumers only. Price discrimination between tourists and residents is not allowed: both visitors and domestic consumers will face the same prices. 
Since the economy is assumed to behave like a consumer the natural objective of the government is to maximize the welfare of the representative individual:
(1) .
( )
This function is assumed to satisfy the usual differentiability and concavity requirements with the following sign assumption for the first-order partial derivatives:
and . ( )
( )
We have agreed that the basic determinants of tourist demand are prices and different attractions such as climate. Thus, if we can assume that those domestic amenities do not change, we can write tourist demand as depending on prices only.
Optimal Tax Structure
The government aims to maximize individual welfare subject to the revenue constraint (3) and the individual conditions for utility maximization.
7 Following Diamond-Mirrlees (1971) , the problem may conveniently be treated in terms of the indirect utility function.
Forming the Lagrangean
gives the first order conditions for the tax rate :
Writing α for the marginal utility of income to the consumer, the consumer's utility maximization implies that (at fixed producer prices). 9 In general it is not possible to solve explicitly for the optimal taxes, since the quantities demanded depend on the taxes.
Let us now denote the aggregate consumption of commodity by , so that . Then it is possible to rewrite (6) in the form
The formula states that for all commodities the ratio of marginal tax revenue from an increase in the tax on that commodity to the quantity of that commodity consumed by the domestic consumer is constant. Thus if we adopt a tax-reform perspective it is directly obvious that if To obtain detailed results on the optimal tax structure, we need to make more specific assumptions. There are some special cases that can give some intuitive insight.
First, let us consider the special case that all cross derivatives of the demand functions vanish as between the taxed goods.
10 Condition (6) may then be rewritten
where
The idea behind this rule is to impose the highest tax rates on the commodities with the lowest price elasticities of aggregate demand. But the higher the share of domestic consumption of good is the lower the tax rate on that commodity should be. Thus, if we have good .
But they hold also for k
Thus, it is possible to rewrite (7) as
The tourist side of the economy is treated as if there were only one tourist. Further, since the tourist does not work, the tourist expenditure in the country is assumed to be some constant.
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Using ordinary demand elasticities,
we can now rewrite the optimal taxation formula in the form
If we have a good whose price does not affect other types of demand, implying a unitary own-price elasticity ( 1 − = ) ε 14 , equation (9) simplifies to yield the optimal tax on that good:
Thus, the more the consumption of good is concentrated in the tourist sector, the higher taxes we have to impose on the good. For goods consumed in the same proportion by tourists and domestic households tax rates become equal. If tourists do not consume the commodity, the tax rate should be set according to
which is the well-known optimal tax result found in Diamond-Mirrlees (1971, p. 264) .
If the good is consumed only by tourists, so that , but is , the rule degenerates to:
. The same pricing rule will follow also from 15 For the commodity, the result indicates an extremely high consumer price as compared to the production costs. Either the production costs of that commodity are zero or the production costs are insignificant. The result is equivalent to choosing the price level so that taxes paid by tourists by consuming the good are maximized. -The commodity is free in the sense that the production costs are of minor importance. For one reason or another the inhabitants of the country are not interested in consuming it. However, since tourists demand it and are willing to pay for it, a tax can collected. for tourist beaches should be set. 
The Number of Tourists
Tourist expenditure is likely to be of more interest for policy purposes than the number of visits, but fewer econometric studies have looked at this aspect. The most frequently used dependent variable is the total number of visits.
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A tourist maximizes his utility under budget constraints. The supernumerary income that remains after expenditure necessary to maintain the standard of living at home can be allocated among various products abroad. The rule (7) can now be written as
In expression (10) 
An Example
In order to illustrate our theoretical results let us consider a three good economy with fixed producer prices. Assume that the consumer has Cobb-Douglas preferences:
Take first the case without foreign demand. With good 3 as untaxed numeraire the optimal tax structure to finance government expenditures at size T becomes:
i.e. a uniform tax rate is preferable.
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The proposition above treats all consumer as identical, whereas tourists have a zero welfare weight. It would be counterintuitive if we did not want to raise some taxes when tourism begins.
When tourist demand is introduced the optimal price structure of the economy is the following:
The marginal tax revenue paid by tourists associated with a marginal increase in the tax on the commodity, i.e. 21 The greater the value of this term is, the higher the tax that can be set on the commodity concerned. This gives the rule to tax more heavily the commodity with high tax export character. Raising the price , which means higher taxes, normally makes the demand lower, which lowers the sum of taxes received. But raising may induce tourists to substitute to , which at the same time may produce a higher tax sum.
Note that uniform taxation may still be optimal when tourism begins. The rate can, of course, be different. This is true, if Thus, if the change in taxes paid by tourists due to a change in divided by that due to a change in is equal to the ratio of the expenditure shares of those goods for resident citizens, uniform taxation is preferable.
Further, the tourist budget may be fixed. In that case the optimal tax rates can be expressed as
A uniform tax rate is now preferable provided that 
Optimal Taxation in the Presence of Externalities
Tourism is often based on a country's natural attractions, and the quality of these attractions plays a very important role in tourist demand. Quality in turn depends on the exploitation of the resource. As a consequence, there is a negative relationship between quality and the tourist population. Consider, for example, a natural attraction such as a beach. The higher the number of tourists allowed to stay there, the lower the per-capita availability of the resource is and the lower the quality of the good.
Preferences are such that more of the natural resource is preferred to less.
Consumers are adverse to crowding, and human congestion has a significantly negative impact on the users' willingness to pay for those services. However, in the absence of public restrictions most resorts are likely to become overcrowded, since individual tourists may ignore their own contribution to the depletion of the natural resource. There may come a point when more people use the area than can be supported by it. The result is a spoiling of the environment.
When externalities are present, Pigovian taxes can be used to correct the inefficiencies. But the government may need other, distortionary taxes in order to satisfy its revenue requirements. Sandmo (1975) has shown that the Pigovian principle holds in a modified form in a second-best situation.
Let us now consider the theoretical problem of determining optimal taxes when a negative externality is present and the country is visited by tourists. Let good be the externality creating good. The externality is assumed to be a function of the total consumption of that good. Now the utility function of the representative consumer can be written as 
23
The individual is assumed not to take account of his own contribution to congestion, so that the first order condition corresponding (6) 
The way in which the externality affects the optimal price structure is seen clearly in the special case where there are no cross price effects. In that case condition (12) gives the same conditions as before for goods When there is no foreign demand, equation (13) When the foreign demand is present as in our case, the first best would require m λ α / to be equal to , which is a very demanding condition.
However, if the externality-generating commodity is purchased only by tourists, the Pigovian tax alone does never satisfy the tax requirements exactly.
Additional taxes will be called for.
This is the standard "fishing-in-a-lake" story, but things become a bit more complicated depending upon who the "fishers" are ( h or ), who they hurt, and whose utility is taken into account for setting taxes. Social damage should be reflected in the tax on the good, but tourism-caused pollution cannot be taxed at prohibitive rates (or simply prohibited, as a taxable good is probably an excludable good, too) or tourist revenue would be lost altogether. f
Possible Extensions
(1) More structure on the decision problem of tourists. There may be more mileage to be gained by imposing rather more structure on the decision problem of tourists. A tax instrument missing from the analysis can be introduced: the departure tax (or entry fee). The ability to deploy such a tax might perhaps affect the optimal tax rules.
For example, one could presumably raise the same revenue from each tourist and make them better off (so attracting more of them) by exempting them from commodity taxes but charging them an equal-yield entry-fee. Furthermore, tourists are effectively constrained to take large amounts of leisure during their visit.
Consequently, the presence of tourists presumably strengthens the conventional Ramsey-type presumption that complements with leisure should be taxed especially heavily. Moreover, and perhaps more subtly, since tourists have no earned income in the country visited, a uniform commodity tax will cease to be equivalent to a wage tax. This suggests that not only the structure of commodity tax rates but also their level will be affected by tourism. One might expect the balance between direct and indirect taxes to be shifted by tourism towards indirect taxation.
(2) Externalities. Regarding externalities, there seems to be two potential problems.
One is that increased tourist congestion harms domestic consumers, and the other is that excessive tourist use makes the area unattractive to other tourists. We considered the case, where demand depends only on prices. When demand also depends on congestion, the optimal price structure is different. Consumers may even be price insensitive and congestion sensitive in their demands. If the destination is allowed to deteriorate, tourists may well be turned away, for the very thing that attracted them in the first place is no longer attractive. It could be interesting to combine the section on endogenous number of tourists with a congestion externality using the well-known formulation of the consumption benefits of a good ( as , . Thus for ,
(no congestion), while for ,
The tourist sector is entering an age of more competition among destination regions and countries. Moreover, consumers are both more knowledgeable about tourist destinations and travel options, and more demanding regarding the travel and tourist products and services chosen.
The competing countries 25 share many common characteristics specific to the group, such as natural and climatic conditions, otherwise they would not be substitutes.
They compete for the same tourists as, for example, Greece and Turkey for North European tourists. Differences in the price structures attract tourist demand from one country to the other. Changes in the price of the holiday will be transmitted to the tourist as the reputation for expensiveness or cheapness of the country.
But countries need not be substitutes. 
Concluding Remarks
Tourism represents a special category of demand. It is a demand for a bundle of goods and services. Furthermore, tourist goods and services are not transported to their users, but rather the consumers are transported to the goods and services.
Tourist demand functions may look quite different than the demands for the same commodities by domestic residents.
Time is a very important factor in tourism. A person determines how much time and money should be allotted to the holiday. Different people in different circumstances look for different ways to spend their holidays. Natural, sociocultural and manmade attractions are the elements that constitute the main reasons for travel. Prices would be expected to be the most important along with special factors of a noneconomic nature which potential tourists would encounter at the tourist destinations.
Tourism is an economic activity that provides the countries receiving tourists with a dependable source of income and foreign currency. The magnitude of the economic benefit depends on price strategies. Tax revenue is likely to be the major source of benefits from tourism. Economists have long recognized that the ability to export taxes to out-of-state taxpayers should affect the choice of tax instruments. This paper has analysed optimal tax policy in the presence of tourism with a very simple model. Tourists were assumed to trade at the same prices as resident consumers, but to have a zero welfare weight. Taxes assumed to be the same for all consumers also affect home welfare. Thus we cannot charge tax rates that will only maximize tax revenue from tourists. The home country government must balance the desire to tax tourists with the deadweight loss suffered by its own residents.
Notes 1 A variety of definitions for tourism exist. Mill (1990, p. 17) gives the definition of tourism as: "Tourism is not an industry, although tourism gives rise to a variety of industries. Tourism is an activity engaged in by people that travel." Pearce (1981, p . 1) defines tourism as temporary stays of people travelling primarily for leisure or recreational purposes. 2 Johnson -Ashworth (1990) 3 Goods and services, such as restaurant meals, that are normally non-tradeable, become partially tradeable when the country is visited by tourists. 4 This section is based on Hämäläinen (1982, pp.76-95) . 5 See Johnson -Ashworth (1990) . 6 Once consumers have made the choice of how much income will be allocated to travel demand, they have to decide which tourist destination will be visited. Competitive relationships often exist among destinations vying for the same tourist markets. There is evidence that some tourist destinations serve as substitutes, whereas others are complementary. According to Eadington-Redman (1991) destination sites may be classified as luxury, normal or inferior. 7 In fact, this can be seen as a special case of the many-household optimal commodity tax problem (AtkinsonStiglitz 1980, pp. 386-388) when only two households exist and the second has a zero welfare weight in the government's utility function.
8 Since λ − is negative (as the marginal social value of an increase in T ), no account being taken of the uses of T , it follows that λ is . 0 > 1 9 The statement holds true whether there are tourists visiting the country or not. See Diamond-Mirrlees (1971) pp. 261-262. 10 A more reasonable assumption would be that commodities fall into groups so that goods are more or less independent between the groups, but dependent within the group. 11 Equivalent to rule (13) in Sandmo (1976), p. 45. 12 This particular model does not consider practical concerns that tend to favour simple systems, things like implementation costs, compliance costs, transparency, etc., which appear to influence actual government policymaking. For instance, in European countries there has been a move towards uniformity of tax rates with the introduction of value added tax. ( -At the same time differential rates have been maintained in most countries.) 13 This is a natural assumption, since when making their travel plans, tourists have to make the choice how much income will be allocated to the vacation package as a whole. Even though the tourist budget is assumed to be fixed, there still remains the question of how the sum is to be allocated between different goods. -In reality, currency restrictions are imposed on people travelling abroad and limits are imposed on foreign tourists concerning the importation or exportation of the currency of the country visited. (Applicable only to a fraction of world vacation travel spending.) 14 Cournot aggregation condition.
15 This is also the pricing rule of a monopolist operating at zero cost if = ε . 16 Goods produced at zero marginal cost should be free if there is no rivalry (no congestion) in use and if fixed costs can be covered by a lump sum tax. Otherwise they should be charged according to the Boiteux-Ramsey rule (Atkinson-Stiglitz, 1980) , provided excludability can be organized. 17 In general, the entry fees of tourists help governments to maintain scenic and historic heritage; monuments, buildings and parks. 18 Johnson-Ashworth (1990), pp. 145-6. 19 The findings of Pyo-Uysal-McLellan (1991) suggest that among the tourist-oriented products, transportation is the most price sensitive product. Expenditures on food consumption away from home cannot be reduced very much. Thus transportation cost reduction can be persuasive and attractive. The income elasticity of transportation turned out to be greater than one, suggesting that transportation is a luxury product, whereas demand for food services was inelastic. Other income elasticities of demand were almost unitary. The uncompensated price elasticities of the study were -0.580 and -0.250 for transportation and food service. Cross price elasticities were very small, except in the transportation equation. -If the price of any good increases, people tend to decrease spending on transportation most. In the uncompensated price elasticity context, the resident-oriented products were more price elastic than the tourism-oriented products suggesting that many higher income tourists would travel even though there were a price increase. All uncompensated cross-price elasticities had negative signs. 20 The Cobb-Douglas preferences implies separability between commodity consumption and leisure. It is well known that uniform taxation is optimal in this case. See, e.g. Myles (1995), pp. 125-7. 
